CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	Chile	REPORT NO.	25X1A
SUBJECT	Activity of the Chilean Communist in Respect to March 1953 Chilean	Party DATE DISTR.	28 February 1953
	Congressional Elections	NO. OF PAGES	2
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- 1. In reference to pre-electoral activity of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and expectations for the March 1953 Chilean Congressional and Municipal elections, a defeat for the Communists and the Frente del Pueblo is predicted. The estimated Frente del Pueblo voting strength, based on studies effected recently by the PCCh electoral affairs committee, is 100,000. However, this is a maximum figure and probably is very unreliable, inasmuch as it is not even broken down into area distribution, nor was it calculated on that basis. This in itself makes the estimate rather meaningless in view of the regional
- 2. PCCh leaders would reportedly consider the Party as having won a moral victory should the nationwide Frente del Pueblo total exceed 100,000 votes and/or the Ibanista total fall below 300,000 votes. Pre-electoral activity by the Frente del Pueblo meanwhile has been at a virtual standstill, and what little there has been has been considered ineffective. This state of affairs is attributed primarily to the reluctance of regional and local Communist leaders to collaborate with their Socialist allies and the failure of the Frente del Pueblo to formalize provinces, where the Frente del Pueblo and Radicals are banding together in Marcial MORA Miranda (Radical), is there any semblance of effective campaigning other non-Ibanista forces has been equally as slow and ineffective as that of the Communists and Frente del Pueblo to date.
- 3. The PCCh meanwhile has authorized Frente del Pueblo negotiators to make regional and local electoral pacts with any political groups or parties whatsoever, including the Rightist Parties and even the Popular Socialists, so long as these pacts strengthen the chances of Frente del Pueblo candidates in the area involved. The PCCh is however reserving the right to reject Frente del Pueblo support of certain Radical candidates whom it considers "morally inacceptable"

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and among whom have already been included Fernando MAIRA and Luis A. CUEVAS. The rejection of CUEVAS is rather surprising, inasmuch as he is a member of the Radical Committee which is negotiating the various pacts with the Frente del Pueblo and has long been a leader of the extreme left wing of the Radical Party.

4. The ALLENDE Socialists continue to argue in favor of an all-inclusive nationwide electoral pact between the Frente del Pueblo and the Radicals, but the dominating Communist wing of the Frente del Pueblo has rejected this proposition in favor of the previously mentioned regional and local pacts. The Frente del Pueblo negotiators are Communist, Victor DIAZ; Socialist, Sergio SALINAS; and Jose TOHA, self-styled Socialist who is any to all intents and purposes a Communist.

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